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ABSTRACT
Since its inception in 1973 the Act 10 mortgage interest
subsidy program has provided approximately 23,544 moderate income
families an opportunity to become homeowners. The program was a
response of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to the land invasions
movement that emerged on the Island in 1968, and peaked in 1972.
The program was also a response to the moratorium imposed by
President Richard M. Nixon on theSection 235 Homeownership
Program in January 1973.
For approximately 5,886 owners of government financed
housing units, Act 10 became an obstacle for continued
ownership. Alternative explanations as to why government
financed housing projects are experiencing default rates as high
as 50 %, (while privately financed housing projects are
experiencing a default rate of 9 %), have been proposed by the
Department of Housing (DOH), the legislature, and the homeowners
themselves. The explanation with which this thesis is concerned
is that given by the DOH. The DOH contends that the origin of
the problem is a consequence of the bad qualification process
administered by the DOH itself, and the lack of homeowner
interest in keeping their homes.
This thesis is a case study of one of 72 government financed
housing projects and was undertaken to prove that the combination
of the fixed nature of the subsidy mechanism, the impact of
employment instability among these families, and the lack of
effective responses from the DOH to default episodes are stronger
explanations to such a high default rate. The thrust of the
findings tended to confirm this contention.
A more complete assessment of the impact of the program in
all government and privately financed houisng projects is needed.
A broader analysis of the experience gained through this program
is urgently needed in order to correct the problems inherent to
it.
Future housing policies and programs should be formulated
and implemented as part of a coherent economic development
i
strategy for Puerto Rico. No homeownership program will
effectively address the housing needs of those in the lower end
of moderate income families unless employment issues are fully
addressed by the Government and the private sector.
Thesis Supervisor: Bish Sanyal, Phd.
Title: Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Planning.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
On July 5, 1973, the Governor of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico signed a Bill creating for the first time in P.R. a
government assisted market mortgage interest subsidy program.
This came six months after President Richard M. Nixon imposed a
moratorium on Section 235 Homeownership Program. A program for
moderate income families, Act 10 of July 5, 1973, was created
by the administration of Governor Rafael Hernandez Colon as
both a response to the negative impact of the moratorium on
Commonwealth housing programs and the housing construction
industry, and to the acute shortage of housing as reflected in
the land invasions movement 1_/ that emerged on the Island in
1968, peaked in 1972, and disappeared temporarily in 1976. 2_/
In June 1979, I was working as an organizer for a
community development corporation based in the southeast region
of the island. I met with residents of a government promoted
Act 10 housing project in the municipio of Salinas to discuss
their problems and see how the CDC could be of help to them.
Las Antillas housing project in Salinas is one of 72 housing
projects that as of August, 1981, was promoted by three
agencies of the Department of Housing of the Commonwealth of
P.R. -- the Urban Renewal and Housing Corporation (URHC- 58
1_/ Land invasions are defined here as a type of illegal
occupation of public or private land, i.e. squatting. Its
specificity is that it is a consciously-planned collective
process organized by homeless families, usually with some
external support.
2_/ On November 1980 a new wave of land invasions erupted in
the north-east region of P.R.
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projects), The Rural Housing Administration (RHA- 6 projects),
and the Housing Bank and Finance Agency (HBFA- 8 projects).
In that meeting, two fundamental problems were discussed.
The first one was the problem of plant closings in the region.
Because of the plant closings, a number of residents became
unemployed and, therefore, were unable to meet their monthly
mortgage payments. This situation was complicated by the fact
that Act 10 mortgage interest subsidy was reduced automatically
every two years without taking changes in the economic capacity
of homeowners into consideration. Although some of those
affected by plant closings were able to find jobs, they were
receiving smaller salaries compared to their previous
positions. They were still ,however, required to pay higher
monthly mortgage payments every two years.
The second problem presented in that meeting was
concerning construction defects such as filtrations through
ceilings and walls, and cracks in walls and floors, among
others. These construction defects were present in almost all
housing units of the project and to this day have not been
remedied.
The residents of Las Antillas have been forced to fight
on two different fronts; the legal front, pursuing an
indemnification for the construction defects, and the political
front, pursuing an amendment or derogation of Act 10 to make it
more responsive to their changing socio-economic situations,
giving them better opportunities to keep their homes.
The residents of Las Antillas began their struggle in 1978.
They requested from the Department of Housing (DOH) an assessment
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of the value of their homes given the construction defects. They
further asked for an adjustment of the value of their homes and,
therefore, their mortgages, given the depreciation of their
homes. This request encountered a strong opposition from the
DOH--they still continue to oppose this solution. The DOH's
main argument against this strategy has been that a commitment
was made with the bond investors and no change can be made
on this commitment. It is the DOH's contention that the
mortgages have to be paid regardless of the construction
defects.
However, in the courts both issues have been linked,
but in a way that has been detrimental to the resident's
interests as consumers. In order to be in a strong position in
the court in their demand for construction defects against the
DOH and the contractor that built their community it is
important that the residents of Las Antillas be timely with
their mortgage payments. This requirement of being timely with
mortgage payments in order for the residents to show that they
are dealing in "good faith" forced them to put all their
energies in the political front pursuing the amendment or
derogation of Act 10. To keep up with mortgage payments was an
impossible task for a majority of the residents.
The lawyer of the residents of Las Antillas developed and
submitted a bill to the Senate's Commission on Housing and Urban
Development to derogate Act 10 and substitute it with a similar
subsidy program created by the Commonwealth on June 14, 1980--
Act 141. Act 141 is a mortgage interest subsidy program for
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the term of mortgage for moderate income families, which is to
be readjusted every two years or whenever a change in family
income occurs. This bill would have allowed Act 10 homeowners
and those who were in the process of becoming homeowners under
the program, to voluntarily apply for the benefits provided by
Act 141. The goal of the bill was to provide consumers with a
better chance to keep their homes under changing economic
environments.
The bill that the Commission finally presented to the
Senate in January 1982 did not derogate Act 10 but amend it,
using Act 141 as the model. Senate Bill 417 of January 18,
1982, incorporated a mechanism of voluntary and mandatory
recertifications of family income in order to adjust the
subsidy to what the family was able to allocate. This
amendment would have also permitted the reduction of the
subsidy in those cases where the family income allowed it.
This bill had been consecutively approved by the Senate
and the House since 1982, and had always been vetoed by former
Governor Romero Barcelo. As of January 1985, the balance of
the struggles of the residents of Las Antillas had been
negative: they had not succeeded on either the legal or the
political front.
Las Antillas is not the only government promoted Act 10
housing project where homeowners are confronting problems in
various degrees. But, efforts made by a number of Act 10
communities to create and consolidate into a national committee
have not succeeded. Las Antillas has been struggling alone since
1978.
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Former Secretary of Housing, Jorge A. Pierluisi, the
residents of Las Antillas and their lawyer, and the Senate's
Commission on Housing and Urban Development have all proposed
alternative explanations as to why these homeowners have been
confronting problems paying their mortgages.
Jorge A. Pierluisi has argued that the origin of the
problems of these homeowners can be encountered not in the
subsidy mechanism, but in the qualification process of the
families administered by the DOH. 3_/ He has stated his
belief that many of the residents are simply not interested in
keeping their homes. Secretary Pierluisi elaborated this
position in a letter sent to the President of the Senate's
Commission on Housing and Urban Development.
"...[Ailmost all the reposessed housing units were owned by
families that, even though we would have liked to adjust their
monthly payments , they did not have the capacity to continue
paying their homes, or simply have lost their interest in keeping
them." 4_/
No information has been provided by the DOH to sustain this
statement.
The residents of Las Antillas and their lawyer have argued
that the origin of their difficulties can be found in Act 10
itself, specifically in its duality of goals. Act 10 was
supposed to help moderate income families acquire homes, as
well as to inject $247 million into the housing construction
industry which was unable to continue with its projects due to
3_/ DOH comments on Senate Bill No. 417, February 10, 1982, p.1
4_/ Letter from the Secretary of Housing to Senator Jesus Santa
Aponte, September 23, 1981, p. 3 .
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Nixon's moratorium. The residents argue that this duality
caused the creators of Act 10 to leave out elements (such as
employment stability) in their analysis of the Island's
economic structure which directly affect the capacity of
moderate income families to acquire housing in the open market.
For instance, the subsidy is automatically reduced every two
years, until year 14 of the mortgage. This feature of Act 10
shows that its creators assumed that the Island's economy
would experience a steady growth throughout the 1970's, and
that family income would steadily rise. The residents of Las
Antillas assert that this assumption reflects the lack of
attention paid to the consumer -side of the program by its
creators. Income has not risen steadly, and many families have
lost or are losing their homes.
The analysis of the Senate's Commission on Housing and Urban
Development basically follows the analysis of the residents of Las
Antillas. The Commission understands that an amendment to Act 10 is
necessary in order to make it more equitable, and to give the
homeowners better opportunities to keep their homes. Unfortunately,
the DOH did not submit complete information regarding their
analysis at public hearings held in August, 1981, to discuss the
problems of Act 10. Thus, in creating the bill, the Senate relied
mostly on the information and analysis provided by the residents
of Las Antillas and their lawyer, without the benefits of a more
complete assesment of the problems confronted by government
financed Act 10 housing projects by the DOH.
In the bill's introduction it is stated that those housing
units that were sold and financed by the private sector, (whose
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buyers were qualified by private financial institutions) have a
default rate lower than nine percent (9%), while in the units
that were financed by the government, the default rate exceeds
fifty percent (50 %). This data moved the Commission of Housing
and Urban Development to conclude the following:
"This data could indicate a bad initial qualification of the
families that applied to the subsidy provided by Act 10, but at
the same time does not exclude the existence of other factors
that...could have contributed in generating the tardiness
existent in the program... [Tihere is no base to conclude that
the delinquency rate indicates a generalized pattern of
behavior that is based on the irresponsibility and lack of
citizens conciousness". 5_/ (emphasis mine)
What explains the difference in the tardiness rate between
the privately financed and government financed housing projects ?
This is an important piece of information that has yet to be
fully addressed by the DOH. At this moment, though, no
research on this subject has been made either by the DOH or
the Commission.
To date, there are approximately 23,544 families living in
government or privately financed Act 10 subsidized housing units.
All of those who applied for the program were first time
homeowners. The program was their immediate alternative to
solving their housing needs. For approximately 6,121
homeowners of government financed Act 10 housing units, though,
the alternative evolved into a nightmare. This subsidy program
has become a formidable obstacle for these homeowners trying to
keep their homes.
It is my contention that there are alternative explanations as
5_/ Senate Bill No.417, January 18, 1982, p. 2 .
to why the government financed housing units have such a high
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default rate other than the quality of the qualification
process implemented by the DOH and the irresponsibility and
lack of consciouness of the homeowners. Other explanations that
have not been mentioned by officials of the DOH that could
explain such high default rates are as follows:
A) The combination of the fixed nature of the subsidy
mechanism and the impact of employment instability on these
families.
B) Lack of effective responses from the DOH and mechanisms
to deal efficiently with the problems of defaults.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the experience of
those homeowners of goverment financed Act 10 housing
projects by doing a case study of Las Antillas in order to prove
my contention and to assess the effectiveness of this program
in reaching its stated goals and target population, and the
effectiveness of the DOH in monitoring this program. The
central argument here is that Act 10 is not a public housing
program created to benefit consumers, the construction
industry, and the banks equally. Rather, it was created for
the sole purpose of encouraging the production of housing given
the reduction and elimination of Federal funds. The creators
of Act 10.did not give enough consideration to the needs of low
and moderate income families, thus creating obstacles for them
in keeping their homes.
In Chapters II and III, I will discuss the history of Act
10 and its evolution since 1973. The history of Act 10 is
important given the dependency of the housing delivery system
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of P.R. on federal housing policies and programs and the impact
of this dependency in shaping the objectives that guided the
design of the Act 10 Mortgage Interest Subsidy program.
In Chapter IV, I will discuss the problems of Act 10 in the
specific context of the Las Antillas housing project and the
resident's demands.
In Chapter V, I will discuss government responses to the
demands os Las Antillas residents regarding mortgage payments
problems.
In Chapter VI, I will summarize the major findings of the
research and develop specific recomendations regarding program
evaluation and other studies in order to assess whether it is
feasible or not to amend, derrogate, or substitute Act 10 with
other program that takes into consideration the best interests
of all the parties involved.
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Chapter II. Section 235: Reasons for its suspension and impact
of its suspension
Reasons for its suspension
At its emergence during the late 1960's, the concept of a
federal policy of lower-income homeownership which would
subsidize and underwrite the purchase of homes in the open
market by families of relatively marginal income was hailed by
its chief progenitor, U.S. Senator Charles Percy, as "a new
down for our cities". 6_/ The concept was forged into
legislation as the Section 235 program of the Federal Housing
Act of 1968.
Section 235 provided payments by the Secretary of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to mortgagees
on behalf of the mortgagors. This is a supply-side subsidy
program which encourages private money sources to extend their
mortgage funds rather than to have the government do so. This
program provided lending institutions with mortgage insurance,
and reduced the homeowner's housing costs by making payments to
the mortgagees on behalf of the owners. A family had to
contribute a prescribed amount of income toward the debt
service, and the government made up the difference between the
market cost and the contribution.
The intention of Section 235 was to reach families with an
income range from $3,000 to $7,000. Eligibility was restricted
to families with incomes not more than 35% above maximum public
6_/ Senator Charles Percy, "A New Dawn for Our Cities",
Congressional Record--Senate, October 17, 1966, pp. 27258-
27260.
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housing ceilings in each community, with deductions allowed for
dependents.
Some serious concerns about Section 235 and its weaknesses
were spelled out by various housing analysts since its
inception. One concern was that Section 235 was designed
primarly to increase the U.S. housing stock. The U.S.
government program was part of an announced plan to build six
million housing units for low and moderate income families
through the 1970's. The goal of high volume of housing
production was seen as a competitor to the goal of helping poor
families succeed as homeowners. 7_/ (As will be discussed
later, this duality of goals was also a characteristic of the
Act 10 subsidy program).
Another concern was that the subsidy calculations spelled
out in the housing act failed to include certain major housing
expenses --particularly utilities and maintenance-- as part of
the housing costs. Each family was required to pay 20% of its
income for interest, amortization, insurance, and taxes. In
many northern cities of the U.S. where heating bills are high,
owners had to spend additional money each month for utilities
and maintenance, and were therefore expected to spend more than
one fourth of their income for housing. This budgetary strain
would be further compounded for low-income families where the
sales price of many homes is high. This was expected to make
it very difficult for families at the low end of the $3,000 -
7 / Frieden, Bernard, et.al., "Home Ownership for the Poor", in
Transaction, 1970, p.52.
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$7,000 range to afford the cost of modest new houses. 8_/
Also, instead of encouraging the use of old housing to
accomodate low-income families, Section 235 emphasized the
construction of new housing, and restricted the use of existing
housing units.
Given the prevailing climate of urban discontent and
turbulence during the 1960's in the U.S., the administration of
President Johnson and the Congress deemed it preferable to act
under uncertainty on how the program would perform rather than
to delay action on the program. This program came to be
considered by the Congress as a significant response to the
housing and residential stresses endemic to lower income
households in the cities across the U.S.A.
Two years after its implementation, the 235 program was
badly shaken by the exposure of market abuses and federal
maladministration which permeated a substantial sector of
the national efforts in the U.S.. Many families were left the
title-holders of sorely deficient and often overpriced housing
units. Rising mortgage default rates throughout the program
and the high rate of mortgage failures in some areas served to
stigmatize the image of the program even further.
By 1970, these events in the U.S. made the program
increasingly vulnerable to the will of an administration,
headed by President Richard M. Nixon, which was uninterested
in the cause of federal assistance to the nation's housing
poor. Despite many attempts on the part of the Department of
8 / Ibid.
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Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to remedy defects in
operation of the program and improve its ability to realize its
potential, the administration imposed a moratorium on any
further housing subsidy commitments in January, 1973. The
program had been in existence for approximately four years
before it was terminated. It was reactivated in 1975, with
revisions.
In the early 1970's, the Federal Government forwarded
interpretations of the problematic nature of the Section 235
program experience. Their interpretations described the
shortcomings of the program as either being a failure in the
policy concept itself or in the administrative implementation
of otherwise realizable objectives. The first interpretation
holds that there is an inherent incompatibility between the
demands of homeownership and the conditions of life within the
margins of lower-income. The "life at the margin" theory
maintains that lower-income families are incapable of
sustaining ownership obligations because of intermittent crises
(eg. in employment, health, and family stability) which assume
catastrophic proportions.
The second interpretation holds that flawed implementation
was a primary contributor to the 235 program's malconsequences,
leading to market abuses and the placing of many lower-income
purchasers in untenable ownership situations characterized by
seriously defective housing conditions and negative equity
positions at purchase.
In contrast with these assertions about the program as
a whole, strong local variations in program performance in the
13
U.S. were increasingly evident by the eve of the subsidy
moratorium--mortgage default rates varied from a low 2% in one
HUD area office to a high 20% in another. 9_/ However, little
consideration was given to alternative factors contributing to
local differences in program performance in the US, such as
local economic conditions and the extent to which they were
favorable or unfavorable to sustained homeownership. This
"contextual" interpretation 10_/ was mentioned briefly in the
Congress' attempt to diagnose the problems that were manifest
in the program. Such a "contextual" interpretation would have
seemed likely in the face of the strong local variations in
program performance that were evident by the eve of the
moratorium.
Impact of the moratorium in P.R.
The first reactions to the moratorium in P.R. came from the
Governor of the Commonwealth and from builders.
The newly elected governor, Rafael Hernandez Colon announced
on January 10, 1973, that he would study the "adverse effects" of
the Nixon moratorium. Representatives of the construction
industry stated that the action taken by the Federal government
would bring great difficulties to the industry. 11_/ Meanwhile,
9_/ U.S. Congress Housing Subsidies and Housing Policies, Hearing
Joint Economic Committee, 92nd congress, Second Session,
December, 1972, p. 3 7 .
10_/ Bach, Victor, Chance to Own, Phd Dissertation, MIT, DUSP,
1977, pp. 13,14.
11_/ El Mundo, January 10, 1973, San Juan, P.R., p.1
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the newly appointed Secretary of the DOH, Jose E. Arraras, stated
that he lamented Nixon's intention to revise and possibly withold
any further financial help for housing which in P.R. had been
(and still continues to be) of great importance for the
construction of public housing. 12_/
In order to appraise the context in which these reactions
were given, a brief review of the Island's history since 1898
will follow, including a discussion of the interventions by the
government of P.R. in the housing sector.
Puerto Rico became a territory of the U.S. in 1898 by virtue
of the peace agreement negotiated between Spain and the U.S.
after the latter won the Hispanic-American War.
From 1898 to 1900, a U.S. military government administered
the colony. From 1900 until 1944, all of the governors who
succeeded the previous military government were North-Americans
appointed by the president of the U.S. In 1944, the U.S.
President appointed a Puerto Rican governor.
Since 1948, the governor has been elected by the people
of P.R. It was not until 1952, however, with the creation of
the constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, that a
more complete political and judicial autonomy was achieved.
This constitution was sent to the U.S. Congress for
consideration and approval.
The Constitution did not alter the character of the
relationship between P.R. and the U.S. --P.R. still being
considered a territory of the U.S. Specifically, the Law of
12 / Ibid.
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Federal Relations which regulates the relations between both
countries, was not altered. Even today, the Congress still has
the power to unilaterally amend the Law of Federal Relations,
or even to unilaterally amend the Constitution of the
Commonwealth.
The Puerto Rican state is subordinated to the U.S. and
functions as a partially autonomous state. Therefore, its urban
policies have to be seen as influenced by and/or dependent on
U.S. urban policies.
In P.R., the idea of a program for housing development began
formally with Act. 53 of 1921, creating the "Division de Hogares
Seguros" as part of the Department of Labor. But the real
implementation of a housing policy by the government of P.R. was
initiated when the US Congress started legislation for funding
the development of housing programs.
In 1938, Act 126 created the Puerto Rico Housing Authority
enabling the Island to qualify "for the benefits offered by the
Act 412 of the U.S. Congress of 1937, establishing the Federal
government policy to utilize their funds and credit to help the
States improve the unsanitary and unsafe living conditions of
low income families. 13_/
Act 126 of May, 1938, created several public corporations
known as "Autoridad de Hogares" (Housing Authorities) whose
principal purpose was to eliminate the slums and to provide
housing to low income families. The Housing Authorities of San
13_/ Department of Housing,Evolution of the Department Of
Housing, Commonwealth of P.R., Hato Rey, January, 1982,
p. 1 .
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Juan, Ponce, Mayaguez, Arecibo, as well as the Puerto Rico
Housing Authority --which coordinated all the local Housing
Authorities-- were created under this act.
Public housing construction began in 1940. Shortly
thereafter, when World War II began, the construction of new
public housing was halted due to restrictions on federal aid for
this purpose. During the war, the Puerto Rico Housing Authority
began the aquisition of land in preparation for the federal
government post-war program.
In 1954, the U.S. Congress approved the Public Housing Act,
which changed drastically public housing and urban renewal in
P.R. Before the existence of this Act, the Federal government
gave help to the states and municipalities both for the
construction of public housing and for urban renewal, but these
activities were not carried out in a coordinated fashion. The
construction of public housing was authorized without the
commitment that it would house families displaced by slum
clearance programs.
The Federal Housing Act of 1954 had the cooperation with
urban communities in order to help them prevent and eliminate
slums and decaying areas as its main philosophy. Most efforts
were guided toward preventing the emergence of slums. The
communities were responsible for slum eradication and local
resources were used for this purpose.
In Puerto Rico, these programs were not as successful as
expected. The housing problem became worse due to the growing
migration movements of displaced and impoverished peasants from
rural to urban areas during the 1940's and 50's. The local
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housing authorities were unable to cope with the growth of slums
in the urban zones, and housing conditions deteriorated.
In 1957, a new agency was created by the P.R. Legislature to
cope more efficiently with the rapid population growth of the
urban centers, the deterioration of some urban districts, and the
formation of squatter settlements. The Urban Renewal and Housing
Corporation (URHC) was created by Act No.8 of 1957, grouping the four
housing authorities into a single public corporation. The purpose
of this legislation was to create a central unit for achieving
coordination among the different housing programs. The URHC had
the following as it main objectives: the construction of public
housing, low cost housing for families of moderate income, and
urban renewal and slum clearance.
In June 1972, another important step in the centralization
process was made with the creation of the Department of
Housing. All housing programs previously carried out by various
governmental agencies (such as the Department of Agriculture,
URHC, the Housing Bank, and the Administration of Rural
Housing) were transferred to the DOH.
Currently, the DOH carries out its activities with the help
of the URHC, the Administration of Rural Housing, the P.R.
Housing Bank and Finance Agency, the P.R. Housing Finance
Corporation 14_/ and the Administration of Public Housing.
An analysis of the evolution of the housing policies and
programs of the goverment of P.R. since 1921 (in particular, an
14_/ The Puerto Rico Housing Finance Corporation is a subsidiary
of the Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico.
18
analysis of the relationship of P.R. housing policies with
those operating at the federal level) is yet to be done. Still,
it can be said that, in general, the goverment of P.R. has in
the past depended upon and has followed federal policy
concepts, using them as models in its intervention in the
housing sector on the Island. As we will see later, the
creation of Act 10 followed this scheme.
The extent to which the government of P.R. has relied on
federal funds since 1938 for its housing programs was best
expressed by the Secretary of Housing, Jose E. Arraras, on
February 1973. Arraras recognized that "what has been achieved
on public housing and housing subsidy programs was due to
federal housing programs." 15_/ But the private housing
construction industry has also depended on Federal programs.
For example, the percentage of new private housing in P.R.
subsidized under the provisions of Sections 235 and 236 went
from a low 5.4 % in 1969 to 30.6 % in 1972. (Refer to Table 1,
p. 20).
This dependency of the Commonwealth on Federal funds in
order to develop its housing programs (as well as that of the
private sector) was furthered by the worsening of the housing
problem, i.e. the situation of housing scarcity among the urban
poor in the late 60's. From 1968 to 1976, the government of
P.R. was confronted by the emergence of an aggressive land
invasions movement. Land invasions became a popular answer to
15 / El Mundo, February 23, 1973, front page.
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the housing crisis. 16_/ In January 1973, the Secretary of Housing
declared that land and housing invasions amounted to 1,500.
TABLE 1: Construction of new private housing units with Section
235 and 236 subsidy: 1969 - 1973
With Sections %
Fiscal Year Total Units 235 & 236 Subsidy Subsidized
1969 17,495 938 5.4
1970 16,609 4,670 28.1
1971 16,826 6,022 35.8
1972 20,328 6,230 30.6
1973 20,562 3,853 18.7
Source: P.R. Planning Board.
Why this type of housing movement emerged on the Island is
still to be researched thoroughly. The central argument of
research currently in progress in P.R. 17_/ is that the land
invasions movement emerged in that period because of a crisis
in the economic development strategy implemented by the
Government of P.R. since the 1940's coinciding with a new
conjuncture of political and ideological events. Such events
would include the following: the first electoral defeat of the
Popular Democratic Party after 28 years of uninterrupted
16 / While the land invasions movement, i.e. squatting ( in its
different forms) and its result, the squatter settlement,
have been extensively studied in the social sciences
literature on Latin America, little has been written about
the subject in Puerto Rico.
17_/ Cotto , Liliana, "General Background Bibliography for the
Dissertation: State Responses to Land Invasions in Puerto
Rico; 1968-1979", p. 3 . (Undated).
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control of the colonial state apparatus (1940-1968); the
unsatisfied rising expectations generated by the electoral
promises of the New Progressive Party (a pro-statehood party
that from January 1969 to December 1972 administered the
colonial state apparatus); the organizational support given to
popular movements by the Puerto Rican Independentist Party and
the Movement Pro Independence (both parties of socialist
ideologies at that time), and the imprecision of the state
appratus policy towards invasions and housing for the poor in a
situation of a changing economic scene.
Nixon's moratorium was announced in the context of that
housing crisis and the growing dependence of the Island on
Federal transferences. It was clear that the decision was
adverse to the island. But what were the alternatives?
Social and economic data, analysis of the Island's housing
problem, and specific recommendations were provided by the
different interest groups of the housing sector from January to
March 1973, and echoed by El Mundo, a national newspaper.
For example, one expert assessment of the impact of the
moratorium said that "[it would] affect about 80% of Puerto Rico's
population that qualify under the different programs that were
affected by this decision " (Section 235, and Section 236, among
others). 18_/ According to an editorial writer of El Mundo, the
number of housing units financed annualy with Federal funds was
approximately 8,000. 19_/
18_/ El Mundo , January 10,1973, p. 1-A
19_/ El Mundo , January 11, 1973, p. 6-A
21
And in his message to the Senate and House on January 31,
1973 on the condition of P.R., the governor acknowledged that...
"one third of both rural and urban houses are inadequate...
"[Tihe invasion of land and housing that have recently become worse
and extended, is an authentic proof of the existence of that
"crisis"..There is not enough housing for young families." 20_/
A consensus between the Government and interest groups on
how to cope with the situation began to take shape during late
January and early February.
An alternative to cope with the crisis was suggested in
the editorial page of El Mundo on January 11, 1973, (a day
after the Governor's reaction to the moratorium).
"We expect that from conventional sources adequate financing
will be obtained so that housing construction programs could be
developed as to cover the basic housing needs of those sectors
interested in buying an intermediate cost housing unit." 21_/
On January 13, the Secretary of the DOH stated that in order
to counteract the moratorium effects, the government would have
to look for significant resources at the local level and that ...
"it will be necessary to multiply the assigned local [public]
funds." 22_/
In his message to the legislature, Governor Rafael
Hernandez Colon insisted that with local initiative and with
part of an issuance of bonds by the UREC for 150 million
20_/ El Mundo , January, 31, 1973, p. 12-A
21_/ El Mundo, January 11, 1973, p. 6-A.
22 / Ibid.
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dollars it would be possible to double the construction of new
housing on the Island. 23_/ He also mentioned that his
administration would see to it that the private banks channel
"their funds to finance housing for families of meager
resources and, in that way, assume a role of ample social
content". 24_/ In that same speech, he asserted that there were
a number of institutions that had already expressed their
interest in collaborating.
At last, on February 4, 1973, the Secretary of the DOH
provided more specific information on the plan. He announced
that "in the near future a Housing Financing Plan will be
established" that would put millions of dollars to the
disposition of families with monthly incomes that ranged
between $250 and $700. In P.R. at that time, that income was
representative of low to middle income families.
During the weeks that followed, more specific information
on the plan was provided, and compromises at some levels were
reached.
On February 8, the directors of commercial private banks
met with the Secretary of Housing to discuss the housing
problems of P.R. and to explore new alternatives for financing
housing through banking institutions. Among the alternatives
that Arraras discussed with bankers was to convert the Housing
Bank to an agency similar to the FHA, (Federal Housing
Administration). It was hoped that this new agency could
23 / El Mundo, January 31, 1973, p. 6-A.
24 / Ibid.
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provide an insurance or mortgage guarantee of low cost housing
which would stimulate the mortgage market for these housing
units. 25_/
The Governor accepted a proposal from the First Federal
Savings and Loan Association of $25 million for the financing
of low cost housing promoted by the DOH, with mortgage
guarantees provided by the Housing Bank. 26_/ Even though all
of the specifics of the housing program (they referred to it
only as a "plan") were not yet known, it was stated that
mortgages were to be guaranteed mostly to persons with monthly
incomes that ranged between $240 and $750 ($2,880 and $9,000
yearly) an income range similar to that established in Section
235.
On March 5, the nine institutions that comprised Puerto
Rico's Saving and Loan Association League stated their
intention to cooperate with the plan proposed by the Secretary
of Housing to generate local resources for the construction of
housing for families of meager economic resources. 27_/
Specifics of the entire program were not made public until
July 6, a day after the bill creating Act 10 mortgage interest
subsidy program was signed by the Governor.
The analysis of the information that appeared in El Mundo,
the most important newspaper on the Island and the more
influential, tends to indicate that the initial plans to create
25 / El Mundo, February 9, 1973, p. 3-A.
26_/ El Mundo, February 24, 1973, p. 4-A.
27_/ El Mundo, March 6, 1973, p. 12-B.
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an alternative to the Federal programs that were frozen by
Nixon, were probably formulated without the benefit of a
complete assessment of the impact of the moratorium and the
housing problem in P.R. So far documents or studies that were
consulted by the creators of Act 10 have not been found, if
they ever existed.
The problems posed by Nixon's moratorium made the
government of P.R. conscious of the dependency of the Island's
housing delivery system on federal funding. The Secretary of
the DOH understood at the time that it was impossible to
continue fastened to the decisions of the federal government.
The unavailability of federal funds created a crisis in the
housing situation in P.R. This situation could have been seen
as an opportunity for an evaluation of the local economy, and a
time to look for alternatives that responded to the Island's
realities. 28_/ But, that evaluation apparently never took
place. Instead, what the P.R. Legislature created was a
replication of the main provisions of Section 235. As we will
see later, the main elements of Section 235 were taken
uncritically to create Act 10, without considering the special
conditions existing on the Island.
As of February 4, less than a month after Nixon's decision
was announced , the foundation of the program that was later to
become later Act 10 was already laid down. As was mentioned
before, it was a plan that would put millions of dollars to the
disposition of families with monthly incomes that ranged from
28 / El Mundo, February 23, 1973, front page.
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$250 and $700 from private banks in P.R. to the construction of
housing of "social interest", a characteristic of Section 235.
In the next chapter a discussion will follow on the
legislative history of Act 10, and how the program evolved.
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Chapter III: Legislative history and evolution of Act 10
Legislative History
It was not until May 22, 1973, two and a half months after
the banks that comprise the Savings and Loans Association
League of P.R. publicly offered their collaboration with the
plan, that a bill was presented by the Senate's Commission of
Housing and Urban Development. Senate Bill No. 572 was
presented "[T]o establish a state subsidy plan at market
mortgage interest through the DOH or any of its ascribed
organizations to make possible that moderate income families
could acquire or rent newly constructed housing units at an
annual interest cost of no more than 1 %." 29_/
What research was developed by the Commission, if any, or
what documents were submitted to the Commission by the DOH or
special interest groups in the housing sector that served as a
basis for the creation of S.B. No. 572 are still unanswered
questions. No documents produced before 1976 were located in
the Commission's files. They were either destroyed ,misplaced,
or never existed. However, the evidence at hand tends to
indicate that the plan was produced by a task force comprised
of officials from the DOH, URHC, and private bank representatives.
The evidence tends to indicate that the plan was created after
a meeting held on February 8 at the DOH between those individuals,
and later channeled through the Commission for the Senate's
consideration. It is still unknown whether this task force
29_/ Actas del Senado, Septima Asamblea Legislativa, Primera
Sesion Extraordinaria.
27
produced any evaluation on Section 235 performance and problems
in the U.S. and P.R. A one page joint report on Senate Bill #
572 submitted to the Senate by the Commission of Housing and
Urban Development and the Commission on Public Finances tends
to indicate that no such evaluation was done by either the task
force or the Commission on Housing and Urban Development.
After summarizing the purpose of the bill, the Commission
explained its two main objectives:
1. Provide low cost housing to 13,500 families that ..."are
presently in a very special situation; because of their incomes
[these families] do not qualify for public housing and cannot
acquire a house in the private market." 30_/
2. Inject 247 million dollars into the housing construction
industry, to put it in motion.
" The freezing of federal subsidy funds for housing ordered by
President Nixon, has had the effect that the private enterprise
and the public sector has not been able to continue with their
housing construction projects"... 31_/
On June 9, 1973, S.B. 572 was finally approved by the
Senate, and later by the House of Representatives. It was then
sent to the Governor for final approval. The Governor signed
it on July 5, 1973. The unamended Act 10 authorized the
Secretary of Housing to incure a debt of $9,220,000 in order to
initiate a program to provide housing to 13,500 moderate
income families.
30 / Informe Comisiones de Hacienda y de Desarrollo Urbano y
Vivienda sobre el P. del S. 572, 24 de mayo de 1973, San
Juan, P.R., p. 1.
31 / Ibid.
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The program was sold to the public by the Secretary of
Housing, Jose E. Arraras, "as one of the more ambitious
programs in the low cost housing construction history, and as a
decisive step towards the fulfilment of the government
programmatic offering of providing each family an opportunity
to own a house." 32_/ He stated some of the advantages of the
program as:
1. It avoided the cost of periodic investigations.
2. It did not interfere with the privacy of the family.
3. It avoided any family effort to conceal their income in
order to continue receiving the subsidy, and...
4. It avoided family resentments towards the government
every time the latter investigated, and the investigations bore
a subsidy reduction. 33_/
Except for two important differences, Act 10 (refer to
Appendix A) followed basically the same policy concept and
structure of Section 235 of the Federal Housing Act of
1968. It is like Section 235 in that:
1. It is a homeownership program for moderate income
families.
2. The government develops its own housing projects or
contracts to pay part of the homebuyer's mortgage payments. The
government subsidy reduces the homebuyer's payment to that
which he/she would owe if his/her purchase had been financed
32 / El Mundo, July 6, 1973, front page.
33 / Ibid.
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with a mortgage bearing an interest rate of 1 % (this was later
amended to take into account construction costs in high costs
areas).
Two important aspects in which Act 10 did not follow
Section 235 are the following:
1. Act 10 subsidy mechanism is reduced automatically,
every two years, without taking into consideration changes in
family income (see Appendix A, Section 6). The regulations of
Section 235 allowed for subsidy redeterminations, as requested
by the family, whenever their economic situation changed
adversely by causes beyond their control. These optional
recertifications were mandatory for the mortgagor at the
mortgagee's request.
2. In the case of Section 235, the Federal government
did not assume the developer role, while under the Act 10
program, the government contracts for construction of their own
projects, and arranges the interim and permanent financing of
them. In Section 235, the developer role was, and is still,
played by the private sector.
Ammendments to Act 10
Act 10 has been amended seven (7) times. The last
amendment was approved by the Legislature in June, 1980. Two
of the amendments extended the limit of the funds that could be
committed for the subsidy plan, and the others amended and/or
added sections to Act 10. A summary of the amendments will
follow together with comments on the socio-economic and
political context in which they were made.
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1. Act #4 of October 26, 1973.
This Act amended Sections 2 and 3 of Act 10 as follows:
Section 2 - This amendment added to the original section
that any public or private institution, including the
"Administracion de Fomento Cooperativo", (an agency created by
the government of Puerto Rico for the fomentation of
cooperativism on the Island), can construct housing under the
conditions that Act 10 and its regulations establish.
Those housing units can be developed using any financing
method available in the market or using the low cost housing
program of the URHC.
Section 3 - This amendment eliminated the requirement
that in order to be eligible for a subsidy, the price of a
housing unit cannot exceed $25,000 and substituted it with the
following:
"Housing units located in a project in which the average
price per unit is more than $25,000 will not be subsidized." 34_/
This amendment increased the price of the housing units to be
subsidized under the program. It established that in order for a
family to benefit from a subsidy when they buy a house with a
price over $20,000 they will pay the mortgage monthly payment at
an interest rate of not less than 3%.
In the unamended Act 10, the developer role was to be
played by the DOH. It was not until the approval of this Act
(approximately three and a half months after it was first
presented) that the private sector was included as a developer.
34_/ Leyes de Puerto Rico, Ley Num. 4, 26 de octubre de 1973,
p. 877.
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Why the private sector and the Administration for Cooperative
Promotion were not included as developers in the original Act
is still unknown. However, a plausible explanation could be
that because of the urgency of the government to generate a
response to the housing crisis and the moratorium, the Bill was
presented to the Senate at a time when the idea was not mature
yet. This is partially reflected in the amendment to section 3.
The substitution of the price limit per housing unit with
an average price made it possible to sell housing units of one
to two bedrooms at prices that could fluctuate between $18,000
and $22,000, and housing units of three to four bedrooms for
more than $25,000 within a project, given that the average
price did not exceeded $25,000. The fact that the original Act
did not take into consideration the fact that within a housing
project different types of housing units are offered to
different family groups implies a lack of attention, time,
and/or a lack of expertise at the right moment on the part of
the legislators and the task force.
The Senate and the House of Representatives considered and
approved a bill that was still in the process of definition.
This reflected the urgency of the new administration to provide
a quick response to a desperate situation, the likelihood of
more land and housing invasions.
2. Act 244, July 23, 1974.
This Act amended Act 10 by adding a new section--section
1OA--which authorized the Secretary of Housing to incur debt
for an additional quantity of $2,500.00 in order to provide
housing to 16,500 moderate income families (3,000 more than
32
originally planned). In addition, this new section established
a maximum price of $28,500 for housing developed in high cost
land and highrise buildings.
As a justification to broaden the program, it was stated
in Act 244 that the state subsidy program had been extremely
successful. "Proof of this is the fact that... about 7,000
housing units are in the process of being constructed that will
be acquired by an equal number of moderate income families.
Given the success... it is highly recommended to broaden the
program." 35_/
And the reason given for establishing a higher price limit
was,
"The progressive increases that construction and land costs
have experienced, especially in more developed zones." 36_/
This problem of increasing construction and land costs and
the need to amend Act 10 price limits forced the government to
create a Board to be in charge of establishing the maximum
average price of the housing units to be subsidized.
An evaluation of the criteria used by the law-makers to
justify the expansion of the program shows what seems to have
been a consistent problem since the creation of Act 10--their
concern with the impact of the program on the housing
construction industry and not with the impact of the program on
the consumers. They did not know what the impact of the
program on the consumers would be since the program was still
35_/ Leyes de Puerto Rico, Ley Num. 244, 23 de julio de 1974,
pag. 257.
36 / Ibid.
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in its initial year, yet they were already expanding it by
3,000 additional housing units. The impact of the program on
the consumers had yet to be fully assessed. In fact, the
impact continues to be ongoing today. Clearly, the only ones
whose benefits could have been assessed were those of the
housing construction industry.
3. Act 6, November 14, 1974.
This Act further amended section 1 and added section
10(B).
Section 1: Expanded the definition for "new construction"
as any constructed house that has not been occupied, that is
being constructed, and/or that will be constructed for the
purpose of selling it.
Section 10(B) Act 6 authorized the Secretary of Housing to
incur a debt of up to $12,200,000 for the program.
In the Exposition of Motives of this Act, it was stated that
the housing construction industry in both P.R. and the U.S. was in a
critical situation, but that in P.R. this industry has not
suffered a total collapse because of generated activity in this
sector.
"[T]he housing construction industry in Puerto Rico is one of
the most important sectors of our economy, proof of this is that
it represents 17% of the island's economic production.
"One of the factors that had more adversely affected the purchase
of housing has been the high cost of mortgage interests... [Tihe
interest subsidy provided under Act 10, as amended is... the
mechanism of greater help to moderate income
families." 37_/
The amendment to Section 1 excluded the subsidy to houses
37_/ Leyes de Puerto Rico, Ley Num. 6, 14 de noviembre de 1974,
p. 790.
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built for the purpose of renting, even though it expanded the
definition for "new construction." The expansion of the
definition of "new construction" included any constructed
house that had not been occupied, and excluded houses for rent.
It has been said by both the government and the private
sector that the preference of the people of P.R. is
homeownership over renting. More specifically, in a document
released by the DOH in January 1982, it was stated that Puerto
Rican families prefer ownership of single family detached
homes. They consider rental housing a last resort. 38_/ No
explanation is given in the Exposition of Motives of Act 6 to
justify the targeting of the program to the selling market in
1974. Obviously, the cooperative movement in P.R.--one of the
users of the subsidy to develop cooperatively owned housing
projects--was the more affected by this decision than were
were consumers.
A look at the context in which this amendment was made
will provide us with a clearer understanding as to why Act 10
was expanded and targeted to the housing selling market.
A study made by a private consulting firm for the Home
Builders Association of P.R. gives valuable information on what
was going on in the Island's economy and housing construction
industry at that time (July, 1982). The oil crisis of 1973 and
the world wide recession or stagflation which followed it had a
heavy impact on the Island's economic processes.
38_/ Department of Housing, Evolution of the Department of
Housing of Puerto Rico, Vivienda "82", Hato Rey, P.R.,
January, 1982, p. III.
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"The severe contraction of the U.S. economy, after 1970, had
dire effects on the Island's economy. In 1974, gross national
product [in the United States] declined by 1.4 percent and by 1.3
percent in 1975; unemployment rose to 8.5 percent that same year
(its highest level since 1941), while, at the same time,
consumers prices rose by 9.1 percent that year along with
increases in production costs due to both higher oil prices and
the general inflationary pressures throughout the mainland.
These factors severly affected Puerto Rico's economy bringing a
sharp and protracted recession on the island.
"In 1975 the Island's real gross product declined by 2.0;
the rate of unemployment rose from 11.8 percent in 1973 to 15.4
percent in 1973 to 15.4 percent in 1975... from 1974 to 1976,
the manufacturing sector lost 14,000 employments, while the
economy as a whole lost 57,000. However, inflation kept growing
at two digit levels .
"Gross fixed domestic investment (in constant 1954 dollars)
began a steady process of decline in 1973 which caused its level
to drop from $974.8 million to $593.9 million in 1977, a 39.1
percent contraction in only five years...
"Several factors worked jointly to transmit the recessionary
environment to the Puerto Rican construction industry... The
United States Policy of fighting stagflation with tight monetary
policy and higher short-term interest rates led to higher
mortgage interest rates. The upsurge of construction costs,
closely associated with increasing cement prices due to the oil
cost-push, translated into higher housing prices"... 39_/
This, together with the prevailing levels of unemployment,
general income uncertainty, lower real family incomes, and the
inadequacy of Federal housing programs given the higher housing
prices led to a decline in the effective demand for housing.
"In particular, the recession adversely affected condominium
sales at high and low price levels and, in consequence, a large
inventory of unsold apartment units began to accumulate...Thus,
the overbuilding of the 1972-74 period, when almost 80,000 new
units were constructed, was severely punished by the economic
slump of the 1974-77 period, meaning serious trouble to builders,
banks, potential homeowners and the economy as a whole." 40_/
The accumulation of housing units explains why the
definition of "new construction" was expanded, the limits of
39_/ Corplan, Inc.,Regional Demand for Housing: Puerto Rico
1986 , San Juan, P.R., July 1982, pp. 28-30.
40_/ Ibid, pp. 30, 31.
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the subsidy program increased to $12,200,000, and the subsidy
program narrowed only to houses that were to be sold. Act 10's
goal to support the housing construction industry was
strengthened with this amendment.
From that time on (November, 1974), the polarization
between the two goals that gave birth to Act 10 increased at a
faster pace. Act 10 entered a second stage in its evolution
with this amendment, consolidating its application as a support
mechanism for the housing construction industry on the Island.
4. Act 69, June 22, 1975.
This Act again amended Section 1 of Act 10, as previously
amended by Act 6, that excluded the possibility of providing
subsidy to rental housing. It eliminated from Section 1 the
phrase .."for the purpose of selling it", thus opening the
program to rental housing.
5. Act 11, June 20, 1978.
This Act amended Section 3 and added a new section to the
original Act 10. The reasons behind these changes were explained
in the Exposition of Motives of the Act.
"The maximum prices... originally established by the
legislature... have been the subject of successive amendments as
a result of the construction and land costs increases experienced
in Puerto Rico. It is anticipated that this increase in costs
will prevail... in the face of the rapid changes in housing
prices it is considered to be convenient the creation... of a
Board composed by the Secretary of Housing,... the Secretary of
the Treasury, The Director of the Budget Bureau,the President of
the [Housing Bank] and the President of the Planning Board, that
will be in charge of setting... the maximum average price per
housing unit... 41_/
The amended Section 3 reads as follows:
41_/ Leyes de Puerto Rico, Ley Num. 11, 20 de junio de 1978,
pp. 411-412.
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"Housing units located in a project in which the average price
per unit exceeds the one established by [the Board] will not
receive the subsidy authorized here." 42_/
The new section 3(A) created the Board and authorized it
to set the maximum average price per unit whenever the market
conditions required it. The Board was in charge of setting the
maximum average price per housing unit developed in low density
zones, and a maximum average price per housing unit developed
in high cost land and/or construction, and in buildings
clasified as multifamily. 43_/
6. Act 144, June 14, 1980.
This Act conferred the Secretary of Housing the power to
extend the subsidy to those moderate income families that
acquired an Act 10 housing unit that was reposessed by the
Urban Renewal and Housing Corporation or by the Housing Bank
(agencies of the DOH), as a consequence of the proprietor's
failure to perform their mortgage contract, or when they give
up their house because they are not able to perform their
obligations, or other reasons. 44_/
As of August 31, 1981 the effects of the program on the
consumer side were beginning to be felt. Out of 10,926 housing
units originated by the URHC and the Housing Bank that were
sold, 731 had been repossesed (or 6.7%) at that time. 45_/
42_/ Ibid, p. 412.
43_/ Ibid, p. 413.
44_/ Leyes de Puerto Rico Anotadas , Capitulo 21, Plan de
Subsidio Estatal al Interes del Mercado de Hipotecas,
Seccion 660 c., p. 246.
45_/ Letter from the Secretary of Housing Jorge A. Pierluisi to
Senator Jesus Santa Aponte, Appendix 3, September 23, 1981.
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And as of January 13, 1982, 1,796 mortgages subsidized by Act
10, as amended, were referred to the lawyers of the DOH for
the initiation of foreclosure proceedings. 46_/
Given the growing gap between housing costs and family
incomes in P.R., 47_/ the DOH had only two alternatives to get
rid of those repossessed housing units: resell them under Act 10
subsidy (using the authority conferred by Act 144), or resell
them at a lower price without subsidy. As we will see in Chapter
IV, this last alternative has been implemented by the DOH in Las
Antillas and other government promoted housing projects. The
reason for the DOH not applying Act 144 in Las Antillas and other
housing projects could have been that the high interests rates
and inflation levels created by the impact of the recession of
1981-83, made that alternative unworkable for them.
So far, all of the evidence on the history and evolution of
Act 10 tends to indicate that the program was poorly designed.
Instead of being an "innovative" response on the part of the
Government of P.R., it uncritically followed the policy concept,
and structure of Section 235 of the Federal Housing Act of 1968.
After analyzing its history and evolution, one has to conclude
that not much policy analysis was done previous to the design of
the program.
We have seen in the last section that the subsequent
46_/ Letter from the President of the Housing Bank, Francisco J.
Fantauzzi, to Senator Jesus Santa Aponte, January 26, 1982,
p. 3.
47 / Management Aid Center, El Estado de la Industria de la
Construccion en Puerto Rico, 1980, 3 junio de 1980, Santurce,
P.R., pp. 15, 74.
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amendments made to Act 10 strengthened its application as an
anti-cyclical mechanism for an industry that, unfortunately, is
very cyclical. An analysis of the subsidy commitments made by the
DOH up to 1977 shows the success achieved under Act 10 in
increasing the private sector role in the provision of housing in
P.R. (Refer to Table 2).
Looking at Table 2, we can see that the shift towards an
increased participation of the private sector in the program was
not a gradual process but a rapid shift: from 3.4 % housing units
TABLE 2: Act 10 subsidy commitments as of December 30, 1976
Fiscal # Housing
Year Units % Public % Coop. % Private
1970 52 100 - -
1971 - -
1972 909 100 - -
1973 1,823 100 - -
1974 9,675 87.5 9 3.4
1975 2,385 30 - 70
1976 1,043 7 - 93
1977 7,657 4 4 92
TOTAL 23,544 52 % 5 % 43 %
Source: Department of Housing: Housing Projects to be
Subsidized by Act 10 of July 5, 1973, as Amended,
State Housing Program, December 30, 1976.
developed by the private sector in 19.74, to 70 % in 1975.
Even though the construction of new housing plays an
important role on other sectors of the Puerto Rican economy, the
40
amendments did not take into consideration the impact of the
program on the consumers. The impact of the program on a
government financed housing project will be assessed in the next
chapter.
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Chapter IV. The origin of the problems: The case of Las
Antillas Housing Project
Officials from the DOH have put forward the following
explanations regarding the problems in Act 10 in press
conferences, newspapers, public and private forums:
1. The origin of the problems of homeowners is to be found
not in the subsidy mechanism, but in the quality of the
qualification process implemented by the DOH.
2. The existence of a high default rate in government
financed housing projects indicates a generalized pattern of
behavior that is based on the irresponsibility and lack of
consciousness of the residents.
It is my contention that there are alternative explanations
as to why the government financed housing units have such a high
default rate (more than 50 %) other than those given by the DOH.
In Chapters II and III, the evolution and history of Act 10
were discussed in order to assess the objectives that guided its
design. Also mentioned was the impact of Puerto Rico's excessive
dependence on U.S. Housing policies, concepts, and programs. I
concluded that the program created by Act 10 was based on
incorrect assumptions about the Island's economy. I further
concluded that Act 10, instead of being an "innovative" response
on the part of the government of P.R., uncritically followed
both the policy concept, and structure of Section 235 of the
Federal Housing Act of 1968. More specifically, it was the belief
of this researcher that not much analysis was done previously to
the design of the program; it can hardly be said that it
42
went through a design process at all.
Other explanations that have not been mentioned by
officials of the DOH could explain why government financed Act 10
housing projects have such high default rates. Among them we
have the following:
A) It is not lack of interest in keeping their homes or
"irresponsibility" that has made it difficult for residents to
keep their homes, but the combination of the fixed nature of the
subsidy mechanism and the impact of employment instability on
these families.
B) Lack of effective responses from the DOH and
mechanisms to deal efficiently with the problems of defaults and
construction defects could also be a factor in the high default
rates.
The socio-economic context of the problems of Las Antillas
The community of Las Antillas ( or VBC-156) consist of 129
single detached housing units. The project was constructed by a
private builder contracted by the Urban Renewal and Housing
Corporation (URHC) between February 1974 and April 1975. The
project was sold by the URHC to moderate income families through
its Home Ownership Program at $ 22,730 per house. As established
by the Act, elegible families were those that showed that they
were able to pay their mortgages with 20 % of their net monthly
incomes (at the time of their evaluation by the DOH) with a
monthly payment at a 1 % interest rate. If 20 % of the family's
net monthly income could permit them to pay an amount above the
monthly mortgage payment at a 1 % interest rate, the family was
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obliged to pay that amount, but that amount could not exceed the
corresponding monthly payment without subsidy.
It was in Las Antillas that a social movement emerged for the
amendment or derogation of Act 10. This was in part due to the
fact that Las Antillas was one of the first housing projects to
be developed by the government with the subsidy provided by Act
10. Therefore, the impact of the automatic reduction of the
subsidy every two years was felt by the residents at an early
date. Above all, this was related to the socio-economic context
in which the project was located--the municipio of Salinas and
the south of the Island, more specifically the municipios located
at the east of the municipio of Ponce, the second largest SMSA in
P.R. It is in this area that most of the people of Las Antillas
are employed.
In order to understand the socio-economic characteristics of
this region and how they have evolved from 1970 to 1980, it is
necessary to discuss the economic development strategies
implemented by the government of Puerto Rico since the 1940's,
and the impact of those strategies on the economic structure of
these municipios.
During the first three decades of this century, Puerto
Rican Society wa's predominantly rural. In 1920, agriculture
employed 60 % of the Island's labor force. 48_/ The cultivation
and processing of sugar cane was the most important economic
activity on the Island. By 1936, the sugar cane farms --owned
48 / Campos, Ricardo, et al.,"Industrializacion y migracion:
Algunos efectos sobre la clase obrera puertorriquena",
(undated), p.15.
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and controlled by U.S. corporations-- represented 65% of the
best agricultural land on the Island. Most of this land was
located in the coastal valleys.
With the Great Depression of 1929, coffee and tobacco
production experienced a decline resulting in many workers losing
their jobs. Even though the sugar cane industry maintained high
rates of return, it was unable to generate enough new jobs on the
Island to compensate the workers who had lost their jobs in other
industries.
In 1940, P.R. was still eminently a rural society. The
agriculture sector employed 40% of its labor force. But it was a
rural society in crisis. The deterioration of the cultivation of
tobacco, the collapse of the cultivation of coffee, and the
stagnation of the sugar cane industry marked the beginning of the
decline of the agriculture sector as the most important sector of
the economy.
During the 1940s, the crisis of the agriculture sector and
the high level of unemployment caused by the depression of 1929,
moved the government of P.R. (under the control of the Popular
Democratic Party --PDP) 49_/, towards the implementation of a
two fold development strategy: an agrarian reform along with the
industrialization of the Island directed and financed by the
State. The agrarian reform pursued the goal of retaining for
Puerto Rico part of the surplus capital produced on the Island
which in the past had ended up in the hands of U.S. investors.
49_/ A populist alliance of diverse classes and social sectors
opposed to the enclave system with the central goal of
using the state to promote industrial development accompained
with measures of social justice.
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This capital was to be used to finance the development of new
industries. The objective was to promote and support the creation
of industries with capital of the residents of P.R. and to avoid
the problems of big scale absentee capital. 50_/
Several factors led to a halt of that reformist project --
production problems in some industries promoted by the government
of P.R., a reduced local market for their products, resistance
from U.S. corporations in control of sugar cane production,
pressures from Washington in support of these interests, and the
interest of the postwar U.S. to concentrate in both industrial
investment and the expansion of the internal markets of dependent
countries.
In 1947, the populist alliance represented by tbe PDP began
to break into pieces. The U.S. capitalists were looking for new
investment areas and the PDP began to coalesce with U.S.
capitalists in order to push forward the economy given what they
considered to be the "failure" of the reformist project. A "new"
strategy was begun based on the importation of U.S. capital. The
objective was to promote an accelerated industrial development for
which it was necessary to invest a large amount of capital. For
this purpose, a strategy was designed and implemented consisting
of tax incentives , subsidies for industrial locations and labor
force training, an ample supply of cheap labor force with low
levels of unionization, and a commerce free of taxes and/or
customs tariffs.
50_/ Pantojas Garcia, Emilio, "Estrategias de Desarrollo y
Contradicciones Ideologicas en Puerto Rico: 1940 - 1978",
Revista de Ciencias Sociales, Marzo - Juniuo 1979,
Num.1-2, U.P.R., Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, p. 92.
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This program was successful in attracting investments in
manufacturing. Between 1948 and 1963, a total of 832 factories
were established on the Island under its auspices. 51_/ During
the same period, gross national product at constant prices
(1954) increased from $732.3 million to $1,809.9 million, and net
total income from $609.6 million at constant prices to $1,647.7
million 52_/. This strategy stimulated accelerated development
in the manufacturing, construction and service sectors.
The more important element of this strategy was its impact
on the social structure of the country. In the manufacturing
sector, light, labor intensive industries predominated. In
particular, the strategy generated the expansion or appearance
of:
- A mass of industrial urban workers.
- A group of workers in the government and services sectors.
- A sector of administrators and technicians linked to the
private sector, principally foreign.
- A sector of local businessmen linked to commerce, real
estate, and finance sectors.
- A mass of displaced workers from the agriculture sector,
not incorporated to production sectors.
In spite of the impressive figures of economic growth,
this strategy confronted serious structural problems that were
not resolved. To the extent that the agrarian reform was never
completed because U.S. corporations controlled the best
51_/ Ibid. p.102.
52 / Ibid.
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agricultural lands, the crisis of the agricultural sector
continued. This had two negative effects on industrial
development. On one hand, industrialization was based almost
exclusively on foreign investment (U.S.), not on the savings of
the agricultural sector. And ,on the other hand, the crisis in
that sector generated a mass exodus of people to urban areas
that could not be incorporated into the productive labor force,
even though the industrial sector was predominantly light and
was labor intensive. This industrialization strategy,
therefore, did not solve the problems of unemployment and
poverty. 53_/
The increase of the unemployed and the so-called "marginal
sectors" did not reach higher proportions, however, because of a
massive migratory movement of Puerto Ricans to the U.S. Between
1947 and 1962, 558,000 persons migrated to the U.S. And in P.R.
between 1950 and 1970 , unemployment stayed between 10 and 13 %.
That is, unemployment stayed relatively high but stable. 54_/
At the beginning of the 1960's, in spite of all the efforts
made by the government to guarantee the necessary conditions for
U.S. investment on the Island, those labor intensive industries
began to abandon the Island in search of new cheap labor markets.
At that time, the cost of the Puerto Rican labor force had
increased substantially as a consequence of the Federal
Government's policy to push up salaries in order to put them at
a level nearer to the minimum salary of employees in the U.S.
53_/ Ibid. pp.103-104.
54_/ Ibid. p.108.
48
With this, the exodus of light manufacturing industries began and
the search for a new strategy to attract foreign capital and
to avoid an investment crisis on the Island was initiated by the
government.
A change in the development strategy to solve the crisis
posed by the departure of the light manufacturing industry
signified the establishment of big financial capital as the
dominant element in the economy of Puerto Rico. It also re-
oriented the target of investments away from labor intensive
industries and towards heavy, capital intensive industries and
financial activities.
Between 1961 and 1978, ( with the exception of 1974 and 1975
when direct external investment grew by only 6.6 and 9.8 %
respectively) direct external investment maintained a growth rate
from 14 % to 25 %. 55_/ From 1960 to 1978, direct external
investments increased from $617.7 million to $10,794.9 million.
That is, a 1,507 % rate of growth. 56_/
In 1967, foreign industries, which constituted only 36% of
all industrial establishments on the Island, provided 70 % of
industrial employment, 70 % of all salaries, and produced 70% of
the added value by the manufacturing sector of the Island. 57_/
Foreign (U.S.) investments were concentrated in petroleum
refining, processing petroleum derivates, petrochemical
products, pharmaceutical, electric and electronical products,
55_/ Ibid., p. 105
56_/ P.R. Planning Board, 1979. This source did not indicate if
these figures are in constant or current prices.
57_/ Pantojas Garcia, Emilio, p.106.
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and, to a lesser extent, in textiles and food.
An ongoing problem with these industries has been their
incapacity to generate enough jobs to absorb the available
labor force on the Island. Between 1965 and 1975, these
industries invested about $1,300 million and had only created
6,000 jobs. 58_/ That is, $216 thousand per worker.
This development strategy, adopted in 1963, has deepened the
following processes and contradictions on the Island:
1. The accentuation of the enclave nature of the economy,
where the multinational corporations that control the Island's
production are integrated vertically, disassociating themselves
from the interests and necessities of the local economy.
2. The worsening of the capital accumulation crisis of the
agricultural sector and the competitive edge of light industry--
which has made it impossible to re-absorb the labor force
displaced by these sectors -- and the displacement of small
producers.
As was discussed in Chapter III, the severe contraction of
the U.S. economy after 1970 had dire effects on the Island's
economy. Unemployment rose from 10.7% in 1970 to 11.8 in 1973 to
15.4 percent in 1975 and then to 20.0 percent in 1977, the
highest level in many decades. Both the recession and inflation
that hit the Island from 1974-1976 meant a reduction of real
salaries of the working class, harming their economic situation.
This situation also lead to the reduction of the number of
employed workers in all but service and public administration
58_/ Ibid., p. 109
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sectors (See Appendix B). Taking 1967 as the base year (equal to
100) the consumers price index reached 107.6 in 1970: 126.6 in
1973 and 166.2 in 1975; a 49 % increase from 1970 to 1975.
(Refer to Table 3).
TABLE 3. Prices and salaries in Puerto Rico 1970
=100)
- 1975 (1967
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 +
Total employment
in Manufacturing 136737 138126 150200 152400 142800 131000
Production workers * 114258 114714 125000 126700 116500 106300
Average nominal
salary per hour 1.78 1.91 2.06 2.17 2.14 2.58
Average real
salary per hour 1.61 1.65 1.73 1.58 1.50 1.55
Consumer Price
Index for working
class families 111.9 116.7 119.3 137.5 163.1 166.2
Dollar purchasing
power .89 .85 .83 .72 .61 .60
+ = August
* = Excluding technicians, supervisors and managers.
Sources: Employment, hours and salaries in the Manufacturing
Industry of Puerto Rico: Special Report, August 1975. Annual
Reports of the Labor Department: 1972; 1973; 1974. Consumer
Price Index. May 1941 - August 1975, Statistics Bureau,
Department of Labor.
In the municipios east of Ponce, the impact of both the
economic development strategy implemented by the Commonwealth and
of the recession of 1974-76 was great. From 1970 to 1980, the
municipios of Guayama, Salinas, Santa Isabel, Juana Diaz, and
Ponce experienced together an unemployment growth rate of 435%.
(Refer to Table 4, p.52 ).
Guayama, the largest municipio east of Ponce, experienced a
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TABLE 4: Civilian Labor Force and Employment Growth Comparison by
Municipio, the Region, and Puerto Rico:1970-1980
% Rate of
1970 1980 Growth
n % n %
Guayama
- Civilian L.F. 5,894 100 9,843 100 67
-Employed 5,667 96.2 7,250 73.6 28
-Unemployed 227 3.8 2,593 26.3 1,042.3
Salinas
- Civilian L.F. 3,477 100 5,981 100 72
-Employed 3,267 94 4,896 81.9 50
-Unemployed 210 6 1,085 18.1 416.7
Santa Isabel
- Civilian L.F. 2,788 100 4,744 100 70.2
-Employed 2,639 94.7 3,895 82.1 47.6
-Unemployed 149 5.3 849 17.9 470
Juana Diaz
- Civilian L.F. 5,316 100 10,141 100 90.8
-Employed 5,104 96 8,247 81.3 61.6
-Unemployed 212 4 1,894 18.7 793.4
Ponce
- Civilian L.F. 38,826 100 49,091 100 26.4
-Employed 36,838 94.9 40,619 82.7 10.3
-Unemployed 1,988 5.1 8,472 17.3 326.2
The Region
- Civilian L.F. 56,301 100 79,800 100 41.7
-Employed 53,515 95 64,907 81.3 21.3
-Unemployed 2,786 5 14,893 18.7 434.6
Puerto Rico
- Civilian L.F. 672,415 100 865,719 100 28.7
-Employed 634,961 94.4 733,922 84.8 15.6
-Unemployed 37,454 5.6 131,797 15.2 251.9
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census: 1970-1980.
rate of growth in its unemployed labor force of 1,042.3, the
biggest increase in the region--from 3.8 % unemployment in 1970
to 26.3 % in 1980.
In this region, the industries most affected by the
recession were construction and manufacturing, specifically their
non-durable sector (refer to Appendix B). The municipios of
Guayama and Salinas experienced the biggest reductions in
employment in the manufacturing sector throughout the decade.
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As we will discuss later, the reduction of job opportunities in
Guayama because of plant closings as well as the establishment
of capital intensive industries was to have a negative impact
in Las Antillas.
What was the impact of that development strategy and the
recessions of 1974-76 and 1981-83 in Las Antillas ? The
following studies the history of Las Antillas, some of its
socio-economic characteristics, and how they have evolved from
1974 to the early 80's.
The evolution of the socio-economic profile of Las Antillas
As of December 1974 as reflected in a sample of 40 original
households surveyed on April 1985, 71 % of the surveyed labor
force was employed in non-durable manufacturing and services
industries, the latter being the more represented industry
employing 40 % of the surveyed labor force, followed by
manufacturing with 35 %. (Refer to Table 5, p. 54).
A comparison between industry of employed persons in 1974
and 1985 in Las Antillas shows that manufacturing experienced a
rate of growth of - 41 %, while service industry experienced a
rate of growth of 32 %. However, this has to be taken with a
grain of salt. Given that, (as we will see later on), the
original population of Las Antillas has changed since 1974--as
of April 1985 only 61 % of the original owners still reside in
the community. This sample could not be a fair representation
of industry of employed persons in 1974. More specifically:
information provided by residents of the community indicates
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TABLE 5 :Industry of employed persons in a sample of 40
households + Las Antillas, Salinas: December 1974 -
April 1985
Industry 1974 1985
n % n %
- Agric.,Forestry,Fishing -- -- -- --
- Mining
- Construction 2 4 -- --
- Manufacturing 17 35 10 22
- Durable (2) (12) (2) (20)
- Nondurable (15) (88) (6) (60)
- Not specified (2) (20)
- Trans., Comm., & other
Public Utilities 1 2 2 4
- Wholesale and Retail 4 8 3 7
- Finance , Insurance
and Real Estate 1 2 1 2
- Services 19 40 25 56
- Public Administration 4 8 4 9
n = 48 100 n =45 100
+ First, original owners.
Source: Socio-Economic Study of Las Antillas No. 2, April 1985.
that the closing of a textiles factory (Fibers, Inc.) located
in Guayama in 1977 affected about 40 % of the community's labor
force--those that were employed in companies contracted by
Fibers as well as production line workers. From the
information collected through the survey of 1985, 13 % of the
surveyed labor force worked for Fibers in 1974. Therefore, it
is highly probable that a big percentage of those who left Las
Antillas were employed in the manufacturing industry.
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Of those who worked for Fibers in 1974, some were able to
find jobs in the Aguirre Sugar Mill located in Salinas. A
problem with this industry, though, is that it is seasonal.
Others were able to find jobs in services or became self-
employed.
It is clear that the impact of employment instability on
the region has been negative as reflected in a survey of the
community in 1981. Out of 66 households surveyed, 73 % had to
allocate between 21 to 69 % of their incomes to pay their
monthly mortgage payments (refer to Table 6).
TABLE 6: Monthly mortgage payment as percentage of family
gross monthly income +,Las Antillas, Salinas: May 1982
Percentage
level n %
< 20 18 27.3
21 - 40 37 56.1
41 - 60 8 12.1
61 > 3 4.5
TOTAL 66 100
Source: Socio-Economic Study, Las Antillas, May 1982
+ The questionnaire did not ask to give net income. It only
asked for salaries of employed persons.
Since the deductions of Act 10 apply only at the time of
the qualification of the potential homeowner, the percentage of
income that goes to pay the monthly mortgage payment could be
even higher in the case of families that have increased in
number, and lower in families that have experienced a decrease
in family members since 1974. Unfortunately, no specific
55
information on family size and composition was collected
through the survey. This could have been helpful in
constructing a more precise picture of the percentage of income
each family would have to allocate to pay their mortgage.
Neverthless, as of May 1982, it is clear that the ability
of 73 % of the surveyed residents to keep up with their monthly
mortgage payments was different from when they became homeowners
in 1974. Since 1974, they have experienced the impact of
inflation and the reduction of the purchase power of their money.
In addition, the percentage of their income that goes to pay the
mortgage have increased too.
Clearly, this is not the same employment and income
scenario which existed in 1974, when percentage of income of
elegible families to be allocated to pay mortgage payments
could not exceed 20 %. An important element intervening in
this situation is the subsidy mechanism. As mentioned before,
the subsidy mechanism assumes that family income will increase
steadily allowing them to keep up with the biannual increases
in monthly mortgage payments. In order to illustrate the
impact of the subsidy mechanism on Las Antillas, I will use the
amortization schedule of one of the residents of the community
and apply it to a hypothetical family of 4 members--a married
couple with two children.
First, let us assume that this family has an annual gross
income of $8,936.66 and that they are interested in buying a
house in Las Antillas at a price of $22,730. They are evaluated
by technical personnel from the DOH and it is found that--
after deductions have been applied--20 % of their net monthly
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income ($620.25) is equal to the mortgage payment for the first
two years at 8.5 % interest with Act 10 subsidy, or $124.05
(refer to Table 7). In order to maintain that same percentage
of their monthly income to be allocated towards the monthly
payment (20 %), their income will have to increase by an
average of 7.3 % every two years.
TABLE 7: Monthly mortgage payment and monthly income for an
hypothetical homeowner in Las Antillas assuming income
increases
Monthly Monthly Mortgage % of income
Years Income Payment * Subsidy * towards mortgage
1 - 2 $620.25 $124.05 $78.94 20
3 - 4 665.40 133.08 69.92 20
5 - 6 711.95 142.39 60.61 20
7 - 8 763.25 152.65 50.35 20
9 - 10 819.85 163.97 39.03 20
11 - 12 882.20 176.44 26.56 20
13 - 14 951.00 190.20 12.80 20
15 - 30 1,015.00 203.00 0 20
* = Monthly mortgage payment and amount of subsidy for a $22,730
house in Las Antillas at an interest rate of 8.5 % in 1974.
If the income of this family stays the same throughout
those years, the percentage of their income to be allocated
towards the monthly payment will go from a low 20 % to a high
33 % by year 15. If we take inflation into account, the
situation for this family will worsen with no increase in
income, not to mention the problems that employment instability
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could bring about.
An analysis of 18 families in Las Antillas which as of May
1982 were able to allocate 20 % or less of their monthly income
towards housing costs, showed that in 7 out of 18 families (39 %),
both the homeowner and her/his spouse were employed with an
average monthly income of $1,340.29. In the families where
only one person was employed, the occupations that predominated
were teachers (considered to be a stable and relatively well
paid job) and workers in high tech industries (the salaries in
this sector are higher than those of other industries in the
region). The average monthly income of these families was
$836.00 in May 1982.
In the group of families that had to allocate between 21 %
to 30 % of their monthly income towards housing costs, I found
no families where both the homeowner and spouse were employed,
and an unemployment rate of 17 %. Within this group, occupations
were varied. There were auto mechanics, maintenance workers,
nurses, taxi drivers, teachers, clerical workers, store clerks,
and laborers, among others. There were also 6 families
composed of divorced women with children, and 2 retired
homeowners. The average monthly income of these families was
$640.00 in May 1982.
Within the group of families that had to allocate 31 % or
more of their income towards housing costs, there were no
families where both the homeowner and spouse were employed, and
an unemployment rate of 20 %. Again, there was diversity in
the occupations of employed persons: cookmaids, clerical
workers, nurses, and workers in the Aguirre Sugar Mill. There
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were also 7 families composed of divorced women with children
in this group. The average monthly income of these families was
$364.00 in May 1982.
As was mentioned before, many families have been forced to
leave the community. As of April 25, 1985, only 51 of the 66
households who answered the first socio-economic study between
September 1981 and May 1982, were still living in Las Antillas.
Out of 129 housing units, only 79 (or 61 % of them) were occupied
by the original home owners in April 1985. (Refer to Table 8).
TABLE 8 Tenency in Las Antillas as of April 25 ,1985
Tenency # h.u. % h.u.
Owner occupied 107 83
- Original owners (79) (74)
- New owners (28) (26)
Renter occupied 8 6
Invaded 2 2
Abandoned 12 9
TOTAL 129 100
Source: Socio-Economic Study of Las Antillas No. 2, April 1985.
As of April 1985, there were only four known cases of
repossessed housing units in Las Antillas that were resold by
the DOH. The details of these transactions are not well known,
however. The resident's knowledge about the transactions is
that a realtor was involved and that no subsidy was granted to
the new owners by the DOH.
One can only wonder about whether this was meant to be the
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objective of the program--a housing project of new homeowners
only 10 years after its construction. Certainly this has been
harmful, not only for those families who have left the project,
but for the government as well. High default rates are making
these mortgages very unattractive in the secondary market,
limiting the capacity of the DOH to recover the invested money
and redirect it into other programs.
How much responsability does the DOH bear in all of this ?
How effective has the DOH been in monitoring and taking timely
steps to address these problems ? These are the more relevant
questions that I will try to answer in the next Chapter where I
will look at the demands of the residents of Las Antillas and
the way the DOH has responded to them.
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Chapter V: The demands of Las Antillas and the DOH responses to
those demands
"We Can Not Pay, and We Can Not Move"
With this slogan, the residents of Las Antillas expressed
their dilemma of both not being able to pay the increase in their
monthly mortgage payments and having a lack of alternatives for
decent and secure homes.
Some residents of Las Antillas stated in the last survey
taken by this reaearcher that no orientation was provided by
the DOH on what Act 10 was: 79 % of those surveyed answered
that they were never given information on this matter.
It was not until 1977 (the year when Fibers closed their
operations in Guayama) that the residents of Las Antillas began
to feel the impact of the subsidy mechanism and suffer the
problems of construction defects. In that year, the organized
residents requested a public hearing from the House of
Representatives to discuss their problems and attempt to find
solutions to them. The public hearing was held in Las Antillas
on November 16, 1978.
Residents of the community participated in the hearing as
well as an official from the DOH. It appeared that the DOH knew
about the problems of Las Antillas but did not do anything about
them, according to a report on the public hearing submmitted to
the House by its Commission of Housing and Urban Development on
September, 1979. 59_/ The residents of Las Antillas hoped
59_/ House of Representatives, Commonwealth of
P.R.,Supplementary Report, September 21, 1979, 8 th
Legislative Assembly, 6 th Extraordinary Assembly, p.1.
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that an action on the part of the DOH would be taken afterwards,
but that action never came.
Three and a half years went by without any positive
response from the DOH on both the problem of construction
defects and the inability of home owners to keep up with their
payments. During that period of time, three actions were taken
by the DOH regarding the problem of defaults:
1. The DOH refused to accept back payments unless they
were large enough to make the mortgage current; an owner who was
two payments behind could not recover by making two successive
double payments.
2. Given this "all or nothing" policy, foreclosure
proceedings were initiated against 32 out of 83 homeowners that
were defaulting mortgagors as of August, 1982.
3. On June 1978, the Housing Bank and the Urban Renewal and
Housing Corporation (URHC) contracted the services of a private
collection agency, First Service Corporation, (a branch of Caguas
Federal Savings, the second largest holder of private Act 10
mortgages--10.2 %) to manage their mortgages.
For three years and seven months, the residents of Las
Antillas sent letters to the Secretary of Housing, the Housing
Bank, and the Urban Renewal and Housing Corporation (URHC)
requesting personal interviews. They also wrote the Governor
requesting his personal intervention. Finally, the residents
decided to request a public hearing from the Senate to discuss
the problems and possible alternatives. On January 21, 1981,
the Senate approved a resolution requesting a study from the
Commission of Housing and Urban Development on the
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implementation of Act 10 by the DOH and its agencies--the
Housing Bank and URHC.
On August 3, 1981, the public hearing was held. The
residents of Las Antillas, their lawyer, and the former
Secretary of Housing, Jorge L. Pierluisi, clearly stated their
positions at that public hearing regarding the problems of Act
10.
The lawyer of the community at that time, Carlos Rodriguez
Rivera, made an analysic of the major shortcomings of Act 10 and
gave specific recommendations to solve the problems. 60_/ In
addition to those problems that have been analyzed previously
such as Section 5 and Section 6 (which referred to the socio-
economic evaluation of the family for the determination of the
initial subsidy, and the subsidy mechanism), other problematic
sections were analyzed as follows:
- Section 7: This section states that if the owner defaults
on his/her monthly payments, he or she will be penalized with
the elimination of the subsidy. 61_/
- Section 10: The Act does not guarantee the permanence of the
social character of the low cost housing projects under this
program. In this section, it is stated that a property could be
sold to a family with an income that could permit the government
to eliminate the subsidy totally, thereby taking that housing
60_/ Rodriguez Rivera, Carlos, Ponencia Ante la Comision de
Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda del Senado Relacionada con la
Problematica de la Vivienda en Proyectos a Bajo Costo
Subsidiados por La Ley 10 del 5 de Julio de 1973, San Juan,
P.R., 3 Agosto de 1981.
61_/ Ibid., p.4.
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unit out of the market for moderate income families, as
it is defined in Section 1. 62_/
Other deficiencies discussed were:
- It does not provide a mechanism to protect the owner
against mortgage claims. Specifically, Act 10 does not
guarantee the right of the consumer to be heard before she or he
is brought to court. Actual intervention against defaulting
mortgagors is a direct one, utilizing the services of collection
agencies which, in turn, contract the services of law firms to
initiate foreclosures proceedings. 63_/
- Act 10 does not limit the intervention of private banks
in financing housing of "social interest", which is the goal that
guides government intervention in the housing sector. The non-
regulation of intervention of private banks in financing housing
units with Act 10 subsidy leads the government to lose control
over the future of those housing units of "social interest." 64_/
A number of alternatives were suggested by the lawyer to
solve these problems:
1. Derogate Act 10, if possible, and substitute it with Act
141 of June 14, 1980--a mortgage interest subsidy program for the
life of the mortgage (30 years) which provides the mechanism of
voluntary and mandatory recertifications of family income to
adjust the subsidy according to the changes in family income. 65_/
62_/ Ibid., p.5.
63_/ Ibid., p.7.
64_/ Ibid., p. 6
65_/ Ibid., p. 8.
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2. If it can not be derogated, then an amendment to the Act
should include the following:
a. A mechanism of voluntary and mandatory
recertifications of family income in order to adjust the
subsidy mechanism to what the family is able to allocate. This
would permit the reduction of the subsidy in those cases where
the family income would allow it. 66_/
b. Eliminate the disposition of Section 7 of the Act
which provides for the automatic elimination of the subsidy for
defaulting mortgagees. In cases of justified defaults (such as
forced unemployment), the monthly mortgage payments could be
frozen for a determined number of months, giving the government
the responsibility of paying the total amount of mortgage
payments and providing the mortgagee a payment plan for future
reimbursement of that amount. 67_/
Jorge L. Pierluisi, former Secretary of the DOH, responded
to the alternatives proposed by the lawyer of the community with
the following statement:
"I can not tell a family that I will lower to a half their
monthly payment. The mortgage is committed with bonds that have
to be paid. And you can not change the conditions by which those
bonds were issued and how you collect the money to pay these
bonds because the People of Puerto Rico can be declared in 'Bond
Default'. If the People of Puerto Rico are declared in 'Bond
Default' this would mean the total ruin of the bonds selling
system and the government will be unable to finance itself. This
is very dangerous. So, we have to do all we can in accordance
with the 'Bond Agreement', and within this agreement and with the
flexibilty we have, but within the limitations, we work". 68_/
66_/ Ibid., p.9.
67_/ Ibid., p.12.
68_/ Taken from the recorded participation of Jorge L. Pierluisi
during the public hearings, August 3, 1981.
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As a short term "solution" to the problem of high default
rates in government financed housing projects, Pierluisi
presented a Mortgage Stabilization Plan which consisted of the
following points:
1. A six (6) months probatory period during which the
defaulting mortgagor's capacity to pay the monthly mortgage
payments would be tested.
2. After the six months period, the mortgage deed would be
modified.
3. The life of the mortgage would be extended as necessary
to include the total amount of months owed.
The residents of Las Antillas accepted the plan on strategic
grounds, but felt that it was not a long term solution to their
problems. Their hope was still the derogation of Act 10, or
its amending.
A bill evolved five and a half months later from the
Commission of Housing and Urban Development, out of the
proposal to derogate or amend Act 10 from the lawyer of Las
Antillas. Senate Bill 417 of January 18, 1982 amended Act 10,
incorporating into it the two suggested amendments made by the
lawyer of Las Antillas. The Bill provides mortgage interest
subsidy to families that are or would be beneficiaries of the
provisions of Act 10, as amended, that demonstrate that
have no capacity to pay their mortgage payments. The Bill
establishes a subsidy for the life of the mortgage. The
elegible families should have the capacity to pay at least
the equivalent of 5 % annual interest rate. The Bill extends
these benefits to those families that acquire from the DOH
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repossessed or handed over housing units.
For three consecutive years, since 1982, the bill has been
approved by both the Senate and the House, but never by former
Governor Romero Barcelo.
The reasons for the Governor's veto of the amendment were
never given. However, in a letter sent to the President of the
Senate's Commission on Housing and Urban Development by the
former Secretary of Housing, a number of reasons were spelled
out for the executive branch disapproval of the amendment.
Among the reasons given was the argument that the origin of the
problems of government financed Act 10 home owners was to be
found not in the subsidy mechanism, but in the quality of the
qualification process implemented by the DOH.
"Therefore,.. .we do not understand that the solutions for
the implementation problems of Act 10 program lie in its
amendment since that action does not guarantee the reduction of
foreclosures and the reduction of default rate". 69_/
As of March, 1984, the position of the DOH relied on a
partial analysis of the implementative problems of Act 10. Their
analysis was based on the differences in default rates between
privately financed (9 %) and government financed (50 %) Act 10
housing projects. The DOH's explanation for this difference was
poor screening and underwriting, which allowed households to own
a house they could not afford, resulting in a high default rate.
This explanation--that could partially explain the problem of
high default rates--lead the DOH to leave the marketing of
69_/ Pierluisi, Jorge A., Letter sent by the Secretary of
Housing to the Commission of Housing, March 7, 1984, pp.1,2.
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government financed units to the private sector, considered to
be more efficient in screening and underwriting.
"As a result... [the problem of] poor screening and
underwriting which allowed households to own a house they could
not afford, [have been reduced]." 70_/
This researcher has not found any reliable figures
on differences.between past and present defaults rates to support
this statement.
Other reasons given by the DOH to oppose the amendment were
as follows:
1. The amendment applied only to families that were
financed by the DOH, thus discriminating against those families
that were under the program but were financed by the private
sector. By providing only these benefits to families financed
by the DOH there...
"...is the danger that those defaulting mortgagors in the
private sector... could adopt a different attitude towards their
obligations. That is, they could began to default adducing
economic incapacity, or could put pressure [on the private banks]
in order to receive equal treatment". 71_/
2. The amendment extended its benefits to those families
who acquired properties handed over to or repossessed by the
DOH. It authorized the reselling of those houses at the
same interest rate as the original mortgage and the application
of the subsidy for the rest of the life of the mortgage. This
could probably be done in cases where the DOH financed
70_/ Battelle's Columbus Laboratories,Evaluation of the
Mortgage Interest Subsidy Program and Related Programs of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Columbus , Ohio, 1979, p.II-61.
71_/ Pierluisi,Jorge A., March 7, 1984, p. 7.
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directly. However, given that an interest rate higher that the
original one could not be arranged, it would be very difficult
for the DOH to make liquid the value of those properties
since their acquisition could not be financed through the
private banks. Therefore, the DOH would have to deal with high
risk mortgages, and the lack of liquidity.
The DOH opposed the proposed amendment on March 1984. for
these and other reasons (like the high costs that the amendment
would represent to the government of P.R.). However, no long
term alternatives were provided by the DOH to solve the
problems. Aside from the Mortgage Stabilization Plan, no other
alternatives were provided.
So far, as we have seen, the actions taken by the DOH have
not solved or even alleviated the problems of the residents of
Las Antillas. The Mortgage Stabilization Plan came late. The
"all or nothing" policy implemented by The DOH made mortgage
degeneration In Las Antillas more irreversible than it needed
to be. Out of 65 families that were surveyed in 1982, (the year
when the plan was implemented in Las Antillas) 51 still reside
there as of April 1985--14 families left Las Antillas between
1982 and 1985.
Even for the DOH, the program has created a big problem.
It is unattractive to the lending community. Lending
institutions have been unable to sell Act 10 subsidized
mortgages in the secondary market. Act 10 mortgages have not
been perceived as a good investment because they have been
associated with extremely high default rates, in addition to
some uncertainty concerning the financial capability of the
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Housing Bank to back Act 10 mortgages in case of default. 72_/
On April 19, 1985, the new Secretary of Housing, Jaime
Torres Gaztambide, announced a plan to derogate Act 10 and
refinance all Act 10 mortgages at prevailing market interest
rates. He stated that the program represents an astronomic debt
for the government and suggested the use of that money for the
construction of housing for moderate income families. 73_/
72_/ Battelle's, 1979, pp.IV-14,15.
73_/ El Mundo, April 19, 1985, p. 49.
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Chapter VI: Major conclusions
Up to this point, the thrust of the findings tend to
confirm that the combination of the fixed nature of the subsidy
mechanism and the impact of employment instability on these
families, and the lack of effective responses from the DOH to
deal with the problem of defaults, are strong explanations for
the high default rate experienced in government financed
housing projects. The purpose of this chapter is to present a
synthesis of the research findings regarding the design,
implementation, and evaluation aspects of the Act 10 mortgage
interest subsidy program.
A. Design of the program
One has to conclude that Act 10 was poorly designed after
evaluating the available documents and information both prior
to, and following the creation of the program. The program was
created as a response to the crisis posed by the moratorium on
new housing commitments, and to the land invasions movement of
the early 1970's. That context gave birth to the following
goals:
- The provision of low cost housing units to moderate
income families.
- The injection of 247 million dollars into the housing
construction industry.
It appears from the analysis of the history of Act 10,
that the definition of the program's goals was shaped by the
need to generate an alternative that would serve both as an
"exhaust valve" to deflate the land invasions movement of those
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years, and at the same time, to provide a support mechanism to
the housing construction sector.
It appears that the government unstated goal was to
provide a short term housing alternative in order to generate
vacancies in public rental housing projects, that would in
turn, be granted to families with an urgent need of housing,
i.e. potential land invaders. 74_/ In fact, during those days,
the government acknowledge that people's confidence on the
DOH's capacity to satisfy their urgent housing needs was very
low.
"...[The] people have lost their faith on the URHC and are
taking by the use of force what correspond to them". 75_/
One question that arises after studying the evolution of
Act 10 is why the government played the developer role during
the early stages of the program, and later, was handed that
responsibility over to the private sector. It is probable,
that, once the government understood that the goal of stopping
the land invasions movement had been achieved, decided to hand
over to the private sector the developer role.
This is not to say that the goal of supporting the housing
construction industry was not being achieved while the
government played the developer role. As of December 31, 1976,
48 % of interim financing of government promoted Act 10
74_/ The program should have generated the same filtering
process on the private rental housing market.
75_/ El Mundo, January 13, 1973, front page.
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housing projects was provided by the private sector. 76_/
Later, with the opening of the program to the private sector,
100 % of both the interim and permanent financing was provided
by it.
As discussed before, Act 10 followed the same policy
concept and structure of Section 235 , applied to a different
context. As we have seen in the case of Las Antillas, the
assumptions underlying the subsidy mechanism did not fit the
socio-economic context of Las Antillas, and probably of P.R.
Apparently the creators of Act 10 used general economic trends
in the Island's economy in defining the subsidy mechanism,
without considering any possible differences between
geographical regions, or individuals within the moderate income
category.
Once the program was opened for the participation of the
private sector, the target population was subjected to
differing treatment or criteria--those of the government and
the private sector. The different treatment by the private
sector and the government could partially explain the
differences in default rates between government and privately
financed housing projects, i.e. the DOH making low-moderate
income families mortgageable, while the private sector skims
upper income level of the target population who just barely
qualify, in order to insure success. This thinking could make
76_/ Department of Housing, Housing Projects to be subsidized by
Act 10 of July 5, 1973, as amended, State Housing Program,
December 30, 1976.
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these upper level applicants easier to qualify--they would have
less credit problems, more financial resources and more stable
income/jobs.
If this has, in fact, been the case, then Act 10 benefits
have been accrued only by those in the upper income levels of
the target population of the program. The analysis of the case
of Las Antillas indicates that that has been the general trend.
B. Implementation and evaluation of the program
The high default rate experienced in goverment financed
housing projects, and the abandonment of their houses by the
original homeowners, exemplify the DOH's inability to cope with
the problems associated with the implementation of this
program. The DOH has been forced to transfer gradually the
most important functions of the program to the private sector.
That process began with the opening of the program to the
private sector. Next, the DOH placed the management of their
mortgages in the hands of a private collection agency. And,
later, they placed the marketing, screening, and underwriting
functions in the hands of realtors.
The main argument put forward by the DOH to justify these
actions is that the private sector is more efficient in carrying
on these functions. This might be true, but, it cannot be used
as an excuse to hide the problems inherent in Act 10, and the
government responsibilities in the design and implementation of
this state housing program.
From the analysis of the amendments made to Act 10, it
seems that the only evaluation mechanism in place has been that
of measuring the impact of the program on the housing
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construction industry. As of today, it appears that the DOH
never placed an evaluation mechanism to measure the impact of
the program on the homeowners. This seems to be the case even
under the management of the DOH mortgages by the private
sector.
Certainly a more complete evaluation of the program
performance on government financed housing projects is needed.
An important question that needs to be researched is what
explains the difference in default rates in government and
privately financed housing projects. This will require a more
complete assessment of the impact of the program in all
government financed housing projects and, also, on those
financed by the private sector. It would also require an
evaluation of the screening and underwriting procedures carried
out by the government and the private sector in order to know
how the difference in objectives of both sectors are reflected
in those procedures.
There is an urgent need to know more about the program. We
need to know what changes to the program would be of more help to
those families that are in a different economic position of that
which they were when they enter the program. Is the derogation
of the Act the best solution ? What interests should the
government protect, those of the private sector, or those of
homeowners who were evaluated and financed by the DOH ? What
can be learned from the Act 10 program with respect to future
policies regarding tenure choice for moderate income families
on the Island ? It is the contention of this researcher that
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until a more complete assessment of the program performance is
achieved, these and other relevant questions will not be fully
addressed. A more thorough analysis of the experience gained
through this program by the Comonwealth, consumers, and the
private sector, should lead to a discussion on whether to
continue concentrating resources on homeownership programs for
low-and moderate-income families in the future.
New ways and means to solve our housing problems in a more
creative and realistic way should develop out of the analysis
of the experience gained through the Act 10 program. Future
housing policies and programs should be formulated and
implemented as part of a coherent economic development strategy
for P.R. No homeownership program will effectively address the
housing needs of those in the lower end of the moderate income
families if employment issues are not fully addressed by the
Government and the private sector.
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APPENDIX A
Act 10 of July 5, 1973 (Summary)
Section 1: Definitions
- "New construction" means housing units that are to be
constructed after the approval of the subsidy plan.
- "Net monthly income" means one twelve(1/12) of annual income
after deductions allowed in section 4 of this Act.
- "Moderate income families" means.
a. Any family composed of two or more persons with an income
higher than the income required to make them eligible for public
housing constructed and administered by the DOH, and that at the
same time their income does not allow them to buy or rent an
adequate, secure, and hygienic house built by the private sector.
b. Families that, even if they are eligible for public
housing, have enough income to rent or to buy a housing unit
that complies with the requirements of this Act.
The Secretary of Housing determines the maximum income of
families that will be beneficiaries of this program.
Section 2
The Secretary of Housing is authorized to create a program to
subsidize the market interest cost of mortgages to families of
moderate income through the URHC and/or the Housing Bank in
order to help these families acquire or rent housing of new
construction developed under the Low Cost Housing program created
by Act 82 of June 26, 1964 (which authorizes URHC to provide
housing that will be sold or rented to moderate income families),
as ammended.
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Section 3
The subsidy is to reduce the cost of interest in the
mortgage market to a minimum annual interest cost of 1% that
will be paid with the 20% of the family net monthly income.
Housing units with prices higher than $25,000 will not be
subsidized. In order to be eligible for the subsidy plan, the
price of the housing unit should be in the price range of $20,000
to $25,000. The monthly mortgage payment will be paid at an
annual interest that will fluctuate between 2% and 3%, as determined
by the Secretary of Housing. If the 20% of the family net income
results in a higher monthly payment, the family will be obliged to
pay said amount.
Section 4
Net monthly income is equal to one-twelfth (1/12) of the
total annual income, after subtracting the following credits:
1. 10% of the gross annual income for payroll deductions.
2. $300.00 for each dependent younger than 21 year that
does not work.
3. $300.00 for each family member older than 65 years.
4. $300.00 for each physically or mentally handicapped member.
5. $300.00 for each college student older than 21 years.
(These credits still prevail in 1985).
Section 5
To determine the initial subsidy amount, the DOH will carry
on a socio-economic investigation of the families interested on the
subsidy.
Section 6
The subsidy will be readjusted every two years according to
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the following schedule: (the initial subsidy is equal to 100% of
the interest).
Years Government Buyer's Participation
(%) (%)
1-2 100 0
3-4 88.57 11.43
5-6 76.78 23.22
7-8 63.78 36.22
9-10 49.44 50.56
11-12 33.64 66.36
13-14 16.22 83.78
15 0 100
Section 7
To be eligible for the subsidy according to the above
schedule, the corresponding monthly payments should be kept up to
date.
Section 8
The Secretary of Housing is authorized to incur a debt of up
to $9,220,000 on subsidy payment during the first year (1973-74).
The Budget Bureau will assign the needed yearly amount to
honor the obligations incured by the DOH in the operation of the
program.
Section 9
The Secretary of Housing will adopt any neccesary
regulations that are consistent with the purposes of this Act,
to facilitate compliance with its sections.
Section 10
If the owner sells the housing unit to a third person in
violation of the established rules, the Secretary of Housing will
charge the selling party the received subsidy plus the interest
at the same fixed percentage rate on the mortgage.
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If the new owner wants to benefit from the subsidy,he/she
should comply with the following requirements:
1. Be up to date in the monthly mortgage payments.
2. Comply with all parts of law and regulation
requirements that apply to both the original buyer, as
well as to the new buyer.
3. a. The new owners should have a net monthly income as
to be able to pay the required monthly payment in the
year of sale with 20 % of their net monthly
income (refer to Section 6).
b. If 20% of their net monthly income is higher than
the corresponding payment for that year, the family
will be obliged to pay that higher amount.
c. On the contrary, if 20 % of the net monthly
income is equal to, or higher than the monthly
mortgage payment at market interest rate, the subsidy
will end inmediately.
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Percentage distribution of employment by
and over: 1970 - 1980.
industry: Employed persons 16 years old
Guayama Salinas Santa Isabel Juana Diaz Ponce The Region Puerto Rico
Industry 70 80 70 80 70 80 70 80 70 80 70 80 70 80
Agric.,Fish,
Forestry 11 5 18 13 28 13 14 11 4 2 8 5 8 4
Mining .2 - .1 - - - -6 .5 .1 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1
Construction 14 7 12 6 10 6 18 10 13 7 14 7 12 7
Manufacturing 26 21 32 26 25 25 24 20 25 22 26 22 26 20
-Durable (30) (20) (4) (25) (6) (40) (27) (34) (28)(33) (25) (31) (27) (37)
-Non-durable (70) (81) (96j (75) (94) (60) (73) (66) (72)(67) (75) (69) (73) (63)
Trans.,Comm.,
& other pub.
utilities. 5 8 6 8 6 6 5 5 7 7 6 7 7 7
Wholesale &
retail 16 15 10 12 10 12 13 13 19 20 16 17 17 18
Finance, Ins.,
& Real Estate 2 2 .3 1 .1 .6 .8 2 2 3 2 2 3 4
Services 20 30 17 23 16 23 19 28 24 30 22 29 32 28
Public Admin. 6 13 5 12 5 16 7 10 6 10 6 11 8 13
TOTAL 100.2 101 100.4 101 100.1 101.6 101.4 99.5 100 101.2 100.2 100.2 100.2 101.1
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census; 1970,1980.
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